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MILITARY QRDERS AS A DEFENSE IN

CML COURTS'
A. W. BROWN

2

1. The purpose of this paper is to present a review of the decisions
of courts and the views of certain text writers, which relate to the
general, subject of military orders as a defense in civil courts, to summarize them, and to venture roughly to indicate th6 rt16 d~cid~nd!
that will probably be developed by the tribunals in their determination
of certain cases that await an authoritative and final decision.
2. The subject for discussion was presented in the following
form:
"The extent to which obedience to military orders would justify the commission of acts which would otherwise be punishable in a civil court."

3. The rule in tort actions seems to have been finally and fairly
definitely established by a long line of decisions from that in the case
of Captain Gambier of the British navy, which is referred to by Lord
Mansfield in M6styn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowper 180, to that in Franks v.
Smith, decided in 1911 and reported in 142 Kentucky, 232. Some of
3
the more important cases are cited in the notes.
'Read before the annual meeting of the American Society of Military Law,
Chicago, Septeilber, 1916.
2
Captain, Acting Judge Advocate, U. S. A.
3Mostyn v. Fabrigas,1 Cowp. 180 (1774);
Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 176 (1804);
Ruan v. Perry, 3' Cains 120 (1805) ;
Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806);
Brown v. Howard, 14 Johns 118 (1817);
Bell v. Tooley, 11 Ire. 605 (1850);
Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 Howard 115 (1851);
Despan v. Olney, 1 Curtis 306 (1852)
Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray 45 (1854);
Clay v. U. S., Devereux 25 (1855) ;
Skeen v. Monkheimer, 21 Ind. 4 (1863)
Barrow v. Page, 5 Haywood 98 (1863) ;
Trammell v. Bassett, 24 Ark. 499 (1866);
Keighly v. Bell, 4 Fost. and Fin. 790 (1866);
Christian County v. Rankin, 2 Duvall 502 (1866);
Wiggins v. U. S., 3 Court of Claims 412 (1867);
McCall v. McDowell, 1 Abbott, 212 (1867);
Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142 (1867) ;
Weatherspoon v. Woody, 5 Cold. 149 (1867);
Terrill v. Rankin, 2 Bush 53 (1867) ;
Sellards et al. v. Zomes, 5 Bush 90 (1868);
Hogue v. Penn, 3 Bush 663 (1868) ;
Wilson v. Franklin, 63 N. C. 259 (1869);
Dills v. Hatcher, 6 Bush 606 (1869) ;
Ferguson v. Loar, 5 Bush 689 (1869);
Teagarden v. Graham, 31 Ind. 422 (1869);
Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C. 141 (1870);
Holmes v. Sheridan et al., 1 Dillon 351 (1870);
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The rule established by the decisions seems to be this: An order
emanating from a military superior, which in fact he is not legally
authorized to give, is under no circumstances a defense in an actionfor damages against an inferior who executes it; or, as stated by
Winthrop 4 :
"An order which is in fact illegal-which commands the doing of an act
which is unlawful or legally unauthorized-can, however regular, proper, or
just it may appear on its face, protect no one concerned in the performance;
that the superior who gives it and causes its execution, and the inferior who
actually executes it as ordered, will both, or either, be liable in damages for
a trespass to any party aggrieved."

4. The decisions in a few cases and the dicta in many are somewhat at variance with the rule as above stated.
For instance, in Tramwell v. Bassett, 24 Arkansas 499, the court
held a plea to an action of trespass good, which set up the existence
of a civil war, that the defendants were soldiers in that war, and that
the acts complained of were done by order of their commanding officer.
The court in this case made a distinction between the liability
of enlisted men and officers in such cases, apparently on the untenable
ground that orders to officers were less obligatory than orders to enlisted men.
Again, in the case of Keighly v. Bell, 4 Foster and Finlason, 790,
Judge Willes is reported to have said:
"I believe that the better opinion is that an officer or soldier acting under
the orders of his superior not being necessarily or manifestly illegal-would
be justified by his orders."

So in the case of McCall v. McDowell, 1 Abbott, 212, the
court said:
"Except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first blush it is
apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding that the order is illegal,
I cannot but think that the law should excuse the military subordinate when
acting in obedience to the orders of his commander."
"Between an order plainly illegal and one palpably otherwise-particularly
in time of war-there is a wide middleground, where the ultimate legality
and propriety of orders depends or may depend upon circumstances and conMilligan v. Hovey, 3 Bissell 13 (1871) ;
McLaughlin v. Green, 50 Miss. 453 (1874);
Koonce v. Davis, 72 N. C. 218 (1875);
Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S.204 (1877) ;
Head v. Porter,48 Fed. Rep. 481 (1891);
Stanley v. Sczwalby, 85 Tex. 348 (1892);
In re Anderson, 94 Fed. Rep. 487 (1899) ;
Franks v. Smith, 142 Kentucky 232 (1911).
4
Winthrops' Military Law and Precedents, 2d Ed., Vol. II, p. 1386.
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ditions of which it cannot be expected that the inferior is informed or advised.
In such cases justice to the subordinate demands, and the necessity and efficiency of the public service require, that the order of the superior should
protect the inferior; leaving the responsibility to rest where it properly belongs-upon the officer who gave the command."
In this case, however, the decision as to the subordinate-was not
based on the foregoing reasoning, but on the Act of Mifay 11, 1866,
which made the order of any military superior a defense to such an
action.
In Herlihy v. Donohue, et al., it appeared that two subor4Y2.
dinate officers and certain enlisted men were ordered to destroy certain liquor, which they did, the situation being such that such an order
might have been lawful. In a suit against the officer who gave the
order and the two subordinates the Supreme Court of Montana held
that only the former was liable. (161 Pac. Rep. 164.).
The court said:
"If the order is one which the superior might lawfully make, the inferior
cannot refuse obedience until he shall have investigated the surrounding circumstances and determined for himself that they justify the order in the particular instance. If, on the other hand, the order is so palpably illegal or without authority that any reasonably prudent man ought to recognize the fact,
obedience thereto furnishes no excuse for a wrongful act, even though disobedience may subject the offender to punishment at the hands of a military
tribunal."
. 5. Certain objections to the rule of exemption contended for in
the McCall case appear when we consider the application of such a
rule to easily supposable cases, and examine the principal assumptions
on which it is founded.
The rule proposes to exempt inferiors from liability for'damages
caused by them in carrying but orders in all cases except "where at
first blush it is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding
that the order is illegal."
This seems to be an uncertain standard to go by. What is palpable
to one is frequently far from being so to another, even among persons
of uncommon understanding. How often do we see dissenting opinions
animadverting on the majority holding as "palpably,'" "plainly," or
"obviously" -wrong.
Moreover, such a rule* would work an injustice by exempting
those inferiors whose understanding was above the commonest, and
who in fact appreciated the illegality of their acts, and at the same
time holding accountable those who, through automatic, unthinking,
obedience to orders, or through dense ignorance were in fact oblivious
of wrong doing.
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*The position of a plaintiff under such a rule might easily be
peculiarly difficult.
-Hemust find the particular officer among the military hierarchy
who originated the illegal order, and to do this may have to resort to
a succession of suits against the inferiors-of that officer, each of whom
reveals-the identity of his next superior in exculpating himself; and,
as a practical matter, it is not at all unlikely that, when finally located,
the superior might succeed in escaping liability on ,the ground that his
orders as givenby him did not warrant the action taken by the person
who executed them.
The assumptions of injustice to the subordinate and injury to the
public service do not seem to be correct. In any case where the subordinate is really without fault and only technically liable, he would
have an action for indemnity against the superior who gave the order, 5
and it would be difficult to show any appreciable injury to the public
ser-ice resulting from the frequent application of the rule that holds
the subordinate liable.
6. Whatever may be the actual merits of the opposing views,
the rule in tort actions appears to have been definitely settled substantially as stated by Winthrop and has ,been applied in some extreme cases.
In Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Bissell 13, members of ,a military commission, acting as such under military orders in a case where the
commission had no jurisdiction, were held liable in an action for
wrongful arrest and imprisonment, although the want of jurisdiction
was by no means apparent to men of uncommon understanding and
required a decision of the Supreme Court to determine it.
In Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, an army officer obeying the orders
of his superior was held liable for seizing certain whiskey, which,
had it been located in Indian country he would have been authorized
to seize. The officer believed in good faith and on reasonable grounds
that it was Indian country, and it took a judicial demonstration of
some length to show that it was not.

--

7. The only exemption in favor of the inferior who acts solely in
bona fide obedience to illegal orders is from exemplary or punitive
damages.6
As a practical matter, however, an inferior, who is in fr5 con5
Cooley
6

on Torts, 3d Ed., Vol. I, pp. 255, 256.

lohnson v. Jones, 44 Il1. 142;
McLaughlin v. Green, 50 Miss. 453;
Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Bissell 13..
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sc ntiae is excusable for the harm he has done, has little to fear from
the operation of the rule that makes him liable.
To meet such cases arising in the civil war, general acts of indemnity were passed or adopted, and to meet particular cases Congress
has occasionally relieved officers from the judgments against them,
as was done in Colonel Mitchell's case. (Act March 11, 1852, 10

St. 727.)
8. The rules applicable to cases of military irferiors, who, in
complying with illegal orders of their superiors, do acts which, did
the military relation not exist, would be criminal, do not appear to be
definitely settled.
The extreme penalty for disobedience of lawful military orders,
and the resulting dilemma in which a well-meaning soldier may be
placed, were the ordinary rules of criminal law held applicable, of
being compelled at his peril, correctly and perhaps instantly to pass
upon the legality of such orders, have led many to consider what
modification might or should be made in the ordinary rules in order
to rescue the soldier from the penal consequences of acting under a
wrong guess.
9. As might be expected the views vary from that of the extremist on the' military side who, impressed with the importance of
instant, unthinking obedience, contend that any such act is justified
which is not instantly perceived to be manifestly and clearly illegal,
to that of Bishop and other civilians who view the matter as if the
soldier proceeded self-moved.
And as might also be expected the true rule will probably be found
somewhere in between these extremes, and which while not creating
a new ground of justification in favor of a soldier who carries out
orders in good faith will nevertheless make such orders available and
useful to him in his attempt to escape liability.
10. The cases involving this question that have been found are
cited in the notes, 7 and as they are not numerous a brief review of the
7U. S. v. Bright, Federal Cases 14, 647 (1809);
U. S. v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209 (1813);
Rex v. Thomas, 4 Maule & Selwyn 414 (1816);
U. S. v. Bevans, 24 Fed. Cases No. 14, 589 (1816);
Comm. v. Blodgett, 12 Met. 56 (1846);
State v. Sparks, 27 Texas 627 (1864);
Riggs v. State, 3 Cold. 85 (1864) ;
Jones v. Commonwealth, 34 Kentucky 34 (1866);
Reg. v. Stowe, 2 Nova Scotia Dec. 121 (1870);
U. S. v. Carr, 1 Woods 480 (1872);
Comm. v. Shortall, 206 Pa. St. 165 (1903);
Manley v. State, 137 S. W. 1137 (1911).
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facts, decision, and reasoning in some of them will be made.
In U. S. v. Bright, Federal Cases No. 14, 647, tried before Judge
Wrashington in 1809, the facts in brief were as follows:
In January, 1803, a decree in favor of one Olmsted and against
two women, the representatives of the deceased treasurer of the State
of Pennsylvania, was entered in the United States District Court of
Pennsylvania.
The State of Pennsylvania being a claimant for the subject matter
of the suit, the Legislature of that State, acting under a belief in the
invalidity of the decree of the District Court, passed an act in April,
1803, which among other things required Mrs. Sergeant and Mrs.
Waters, the representatives of the deceased treasurer, to pay into the
treasury of the State the money received by them without regard to
the decree of the District Court, and directed the governor of the
State to protect the persons and property of these two women from
any process which might issue out of the Federal Court.
An execution having been awarded by the United States court to
carry out its decree, General Michael Bright, commanding a brigade
of state militia received orders from the governor of Pennsylvania
immediately to have in readiness such a portion of the militia under
his command, as might be necessary to execute the order, and to
employ them to protect and defend the persons and property of the
two women from and against any process founded on the decree of
the United States District Court, and in virtue of which any officer
under the direction of any court of the United States might attempt
to attach their persons or property.
A guard was accordingly placed at the houses of the two women;
and it was admitted that the defendants with full knowledge of the
character of the marshal of the district, of his 'business, and of his
commission, and the process which he had to execute having been read
to them, opposed with muskets and bayonets the efforts of the marshal
to serve the writ and by such resistance prevented him from serving it.
In an elaborate charge Judge Washington established the validity
of the decree of the District Court, and that neither the governor nor
the Legislature could legally authorize the defendant to resist the
process founded thereon.
The judge continued:
"But it is contended that the defendants standing in the character of
subordinate officers to the governor and commander-in-chief of the state was
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bound implicitly to obey his orders, and that although the orders kere ufflawfull still the officer and those under his command were justified in obeying
them.
"The argument is imposing but very unsound. -In a state of open and
public war where military law prevails and the peaceful voice of the municipal
law is drowned in the din of arms, great indulgencies must necessarily. be
extended to the acts of subordinate officers done in obedience to the orders
of their superiors.
"But even there the order of a superior officer to take the life of a
citizen or to invade the sanctity 'of his house and to deprive him of his property would not shield the inferior against a charge of murder or trespass."The court here cites Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 176, in support
of the foregoing and concludes:
"This is said to be a hard case upon the defendants because if they had
refused obedience to the order of the governor, they would have been punished,
by the state. I acknowledge it is a.hard case,.but with this we have n6thing to
do if the law is against the 'defendants."
The defendants were convicted and sentenced to. fine and im.prisonment, but were immediately pardoned by the president.

The Jones case (U. S. v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209) was as follows:
Jones was first lieutenant of a privateer. -He was indicted for
piracy, and among other defenses urged was that of obedience to
orders of his captain.

Judge Washington on this point said:
"The only remaining question of law has been raised in this case is that
the prisoner ought to be presumed to have acted under the o'rders of his
superior officer which it was his duty to obey. This doctrine equally alarming
and unfounded underwent an examination and was decided by this court in
the case of General Bright. It is repugnant to reason and general law of the
land.
I'
"No military or civil officer can command an inferior to violate the laws
of his country nor- will such command excuse much less justify the act.
Can it for a moment be pretended that the general of an army or the commander of a ship of war can order one of his men to commit murder or
felony? Certainly not.
"In relation to the Navy the 14th Article speaks cautiously of 'the lawful
orders of superiors.
"Disobedience of an unlawful order must not of course be punishable, ,and
a court-martial would in such a case be bound to acquit the person, tried
upon a charge of disobedience.
"We do not mean to go further than to say that the participation of the
inferior officer in an act which he knows or ought to know- to be illegal will
not be excused by the order of his superior."

In Rex v. Thomas, 4 Maule & Selwyn 414, the defendant was a
sentinel on board a man-of-war when she was paying off.

He was
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given orders to keep off all boats with certain exceptions, and was
given a musket with blank and ball ammunition. The boats pressed,
upon which he called repeatedly to them to keep off. One of them
persisted and came close under the ship, whereupon he fired at a
man who was in the boat and killed him. It was put to the jury to
find whether the sentinel did not fire under the mistaken impression
that it was his duty and they found that he did.
The judges were unanimous that it was nevertheless murder, but
a proper case for a pardon.
In United States v. Bevans, 24 Federal Cases, No. 14, 589, a
sentry indicted for murder attempted to justify the act under orders
of a superior to run through- the body any man who used abusive
language."

Judge Story in charging the jury said:
It is argued by the counsel for the prisoner that it is indispensable for
the discipline of the naval service that such orders should be given and should
he instantly executed aid that a power of unlimited and arbitrary discretion
resides in the officer of the ship to compel obedience of all commands, at all
times and under all circumstances, even by taking away life.
"I confess that it never occurred to me until this trial that any person-in
this couniy ever dreamed of the existence of such an abitrary power.
"This is emphatically a government of laws not of men.
"The military and naval forces are created by the laws and regulated by
a code which ascertains their powers and enforces their duties. * * * The
arbitrary power of life and death is not committed even to the president of
the United States who is commander in chief of the army and' navy, much
less is it confided to the commander of a ship and least of all to a private
sentry on duty.
" * * * Such an order would be illegal and void and not binding upon
any person and the party who should give the order equally with the party
who. should execute it would be involved in the guilt of murder * * *. It is
not to be imagined from this that officers in the navy oil not in any case
authorized to take away life in enforcing the duties of their stations. They
stand in this particular upon the same grounds as civil officers. They have
a right in case of necessity to enforce obedience to orders and a performance
of duties by the punishment of death. But the necessity must be a clear and
urgent one. The orders must be of a nature that require instant obedience,
and the force employed must be such as the occasion indespensably requires
"If for instance as the case put at bar where the ship is on fire and the
fire is advancing to the magazine the party refuses to assist, or to obey the
lawful orders of his officers, the latter may enforce obedience at the point
of the bayonet if it can not be otherwise compeiled.
"In the present case it is the decided opinion of the court that if orders
were given to the sentry to run a man through the body who should abuse
the sentry by reproachful words only, these orders were unlawful and cannot
justify or excuse the homicide."
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In Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 12 Metcalf 56, the facts were
these:
The defendants with about twenty other persons armed with
military weapons, about the hour of one o'clock at night broke into
and entered the house of Jeremiah Crooks, who kept a tavern in
Billingham, Mass., and there seized and bound the four persons named
in the indictment, kept them bound for some time and carried them
bound into the State of Rhode Island. It appears from the bill of
exceptions that an organized attempt was made to overthrow the existing government of the State of Rhode Island -by force of arms, that
the Legislature had declared martial law, that W. G. McNeill had
been appointed major-general and commander-in-chief of the forces
raised in the State to oppose the insurrection, that the insurgents
organized and in military array were stationed in some force in Chepachet and Woonsocket villages, bordering the line of Massachusetts.
It further appears that on the evening of the 27th of June the camps
of insurgents at Chepachet and other persons there assembled were
advised to disperse; * * * that various orders were given with a
view of arresting the fugitives whether within the limits of the state
or not, to the extent of fifty miles from Chepachet; that by order of
Major Martin the defendant Blodgett, who was in the military service
of the state, with the other defendant and about twenty men proceeded
as before stated and -arrested and bound the prisoners named in the
indictment.
The court held that one State of the Union in time of insurrection
and civil war in that State has no authority to give orders to hef troops
to pass over the lines and into the territory of another State to protect
itself against insurgents and to capture her rebel citizens who have
recently fled over those lines, and such orders cannot shield her citizens
or soldiers from being criminally responsible in the courts of another
State for their seizing such insurgents, though such citizens or soldiers,
when acting under such orders, are subject to martial law in their
own State; unless there be a necessity or probable cause of necessity
for the defense or protection of the lives and property of the citizens
of such other State or for the defense of the State itself, that the acts
directed by such orders should be done. And of the necessity or probable cause of necessity the jury and not the authorities of such other
State are the ultimate judges.
The court said through Chief Justice Shaw:
"The facts show. that the proceeding of Blodgett and others in passing
over the lines of Massachusetts and doing the acts which are the subject
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of this prosecution though ordered by Major Martin, acting under the general authority of General McNeill, was not the act of the State of Rhode
'Island either by special authority or subsequent ratification. * * * The act
of the defendants then being plainly a violation of the rights and laws of
Massachusetts'and of the legal rights of persons lawfully within its protection being denied and repudiated as an act of the State of Rhode Island,
it follows as a necessary legal consequence that it was a lawless and unjustifiable act of violence on, the part of the defendants subjecting them and all
who assisted them to be punished for such violation of our laws."
With reference to the contention that men ought not to be held
responsible for acts done in obedience to orders which they are compelled to obey under severe military discipline, the court said:
"But this is not the true principle and it would be dangerous in the
extreme to carry it out into its consequences.
"The more general and familiar rule is that he who does acts injurious
to the rights of others can excuse himself as against the party injured by
pleading the lawful commands only of a superior whom he is bound to obey.
A man may be often so placed in civil life and especially in military life
as to be obliged to execute unlawful commands on pain of severe penal
consequences. As against the party giving such command he -will be justified;
in f6r6 c6nscl~ntiaE he may be excusable, but towards the party injured the
act is done at his own peril and he must stand responsible."

In the case of Major General Hutchinson, 9 Cox Criminal Cases,
555, an indictment was preferred against him for the death of a man
resulting from artillery practice at Plymouth, negligence being imputed
to the accused.
In charging the jury Justice Byles said: "If in using the place
for firing, although it might be too low for safety, he was simply
obeying the military orders of his superior, in my opinion he would
not be guilty of manslaughter."
In State v. Sparks, 27 Texas 627, Major Sparks claiming to act
under the orders of General Magruder, both being officers of the Confederate service, seized certain persons held by the sheriff under orders
of the Supreme Court pending hearing on writ of habeas corpus.
He was attached for the contempt and case tried before the Supreme
Court.
The court held as follows:
"An illegal act cannot be justified by an order from superior authority
no matter how high the source from which such order emanates. Military
officers are bound to obey all legal, orders of their commanders, but there
is nothing better settled, as well by the military as the civil law that neither
officers nor soldiers are bound to obey any legal order of their superior officers.
On the contrary their duty is to disobey such orders.
"The orders of a military commander to his subordinates furnish to the
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latter no justification for his forcible interference with the jurisdiction and
disregard of the lawful authority of a civil court.
"But although a subordinate military officer must not obey an unlawful
order of'his superior in command, yet, as he acts at his peril in disobeying
such order it should be 'held greatly to extenuate the offense committed by
the subordinate in the! execution of it.
"Under such circumstances, the superior officer becomes the principal
offender, and will it seems be required to purge himself of the contempt."

In Riggs v. State, 3 Coldwater 85, Riggs, a soldier, received an
order from his superior officer to go with a certain scouting party.
While on the scout certain members of the party murdered one Captain Thornill; but there wAs no proof Other than the fact of his
presence that the defendant aided or abetted the unlawful act. On
appeal the conviction was reversed, the court holding as follows:
"A soldier is not bound to obey an order clearly illegal. A soldier is
bound to obey the lawful orders of his superiors, or officers over him, and his
acts in obedience to these orders will constitute no offense as to him. 'But an
order illegal in itself and not justified by the rules and usages of war so that
a pian of ordinary sense and understanding would know when he heard it
read or given that the order was illegal would afford the private no protection for a crime 'under such orders.
"If the order is not clearly illegal he must obey. An order given by an
officer to his privates which does not expressly and clearly show on its face
or in the body thereof its own illegality the soldier would be bound to obey
and such order would be a protection to him."

In the course of the opinion the court said:
"The soldier in this case was detailed to go with the party and it did not
appear that any further order was given him or whether he knew what the
purpose was. He had no right to inquire whether that purpose was lawful
and if he was present under that order he would not be liable unless he
assisted in the killing."

In Queen v. Stozae, -2 Nova Scotia Deci sions, 121, the defendant,
a corporal of the 16th regiment, was tried for the murder of James
White, a private of the regiment, and convicted of manslaughter. It
appears from the evidence that White having been placed in confinement while in a state of intoxication the defendant with two men were
ordered ,byStevens, a sergeant of the regiment, to have the deceased
tied, so that he could not make a noise by striking and kicking. The
order was not executed in such a manner as to put" an end to the
noise entirely and a second order was given to tie up White so that
he could, not shout. In carrying out the latter order Stow.e caused
White to be placed on the floor face downward with his hands cuffed
behind his back, a rope was fastened to his feet which were drawn up
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behind his back and the rope passed over his shoulders and across his
mouth and back again to his feet.
White died while so tied up, his death being caused or accelerated
by such tying.
It was held in reply to two questions reserved at the trial, that
whether the illegality consisted in the order of the sergeant or in
the manner in which it was carried out, Stowe might properly be
convicted.

The court said:
"The first question which suggests itself is whether the order of Sergeant
Stevens, necessarily called for the cruel treatment which the deceased experienced at the hands of Stowe. If so, it was an illegal order and being such,
Stowe would be liable to punishment for obeying it. If on the other hand
the order might have been obeyed without the risk of injury to the deceased
then 'the order would have been legal and the- illegality would have consisted in the mode in which it was obeyed. In the former case the guilt would
have been shared by the:sergeant and his subordinate, in the latter the subordinate alone-must bear-it.
"A soldier is bound to obey implicitly the commands of his officers but
they must be legal commands, for a soldier who does an illegal act cannot
plead the commands of his superior officer as a legal defense in a court of
justice.
"It may be difficult sometimes for a soldier to decide when the orders
of a superior and the laws of the land conflict. In time of war and as
against an enemy such a conflict can hardly be imagined, but in time of peace
the soldier must take care not to violate the law vwhich is equally binding
upon him as on other citizens for, as observed by Lord Mansfield, men by
becoming soldiers do not cease to be citizens and a soldier is gifted with all
the rights and is bound to all the duties of citizens."
In United States v. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, there was an indictment
for murder.
The facts were these:
Both the prisoner and the deceased were soldiers. On the 13th

of July, 1872, the prisoner was sergeant of the guard at Foft Pulaski.
About 7 p. m. a drunken quarrel occurred between some of the soldiers
at the foft. Sergeant Beel, attempting to suppress the disorder, was
taking Corporal McKinley to the guard house -when he was set upon
by other soldiers and knocked down and left insensible on the ground.
A call was then made for the sergeant of the guard. The prisoner
and three men of the guard at once crossed the parade to the scene
of the disorder. The prisoner gave Sergeant Shires, who was one
of the disorderly soldiers, in charge of two men of the guard to convey
him to the guard house. Shires had lost his cap. and when he asked
leave to get it, the prisoner struck him with the butt of his musket
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and knocked him down. At this point the deceased approached the
prisoner and said to him: "You are a damned mean man to knock, a
man down in that way." The prisoner then made an attempt to run his
bayonet into deceased, who avoided the thrust and turned and commenced running towards his quarters. Prisoner raised his piece to
fire. It was a half cock. He brought it down, cocked it, raised it
again and fired at deceased who was at the time running from prisoner
towards the quarters. The ball entered the back of the deceased near
the spine. At the time he was shot the deceased was eight or ten
yards from prisoner. He died in about ten minutes.
It is disputed whether the deceased was trying to suppress the
disorder among the soldiers at the time the prisoner came up. There
was also some evidence tending to show that the musket of the prisoner
was accidentally discharged, and also that the prisoner acted under
orders of the ranking sergeant of the fort.
Judge Woods charged the jury as follows:
"Nor will any order of a superior officer to an inferior in rank justify
the willful killing of a person under the peace and protection of the law. A
soldier is bound to obey only the lawful orders of his superiors.
"If he receives an order to do an unlawful act he is bound neither by his
duty nor his oath to do it. .So far from such order being a justification, it
makes the party giving the order an accomplice in the crime. For instance.
an order from an officer to a soldier to shoot another for disrespectful words
merely would, if obeyed, be murder both in the officer and soldier."

In Commonwealth, ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Penn.
St., 165, the facts were as follows:
The governor of the commonwealth issued a general order calling
out a division of the militia for the purpose of preserving the public
peace in certain counties in which a strike of miners was taking place
and in which tumults, riots and mobs prevailed.
The militia was called out and the general in command placed a
corporal's guard at a house that had been attacked by dynamite and
directed the members of the guard if any attempt was made upon the
house or any person approached the house and failed to halt when
directed, to shoot to kill. One of the sentries near midnight dish
covered a man approaching the house and he called upon him foui
times to halt. The man disobeyed the order and the sentry shot and
killed him.
These facts were not disputed.
The court held that the order of the governor was a declaration
of qualified martial law, that within its necessary field and for the
accomplishment of its intended purpose it is martial law with all its
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powers; that while the military are in active service in the suppression
ofr disorder and violence their rights and obligations as soldiers must
be judged by the standard of active war; that a soldier is bound. to
obey an order giVen by his superior officer which does not expressly
and clearly show on its face or in the body thereof its own illegality,
and such order will be a protection to the soldier, and that a homicide
by a member of the militia called out to suppress disorder, committed
without malice in the performance of a supposed duty as a soldier,
and under the order of an officer, is excusable unless it is manifestly
beyond the scope of the militiaman's authority or is such that a man
of ordinary understanding would know is illegal.
The court cited Hare's Constitutional Law, 920; U. S. v. Clark;
McCall v. McDowell; United States v. Carr; and Riggs v. State, and
then continued:
"Applying these principles to the act of tl~e relator it is clear thft he was
not guilty of any crime. The situation as already shown was one of martial
law, in which the commanding general was authorized to use as forcible military means for the suppression of violence as his judgment dictatect to be
necessary.
"The house had been dynamited at night and threatened again. With an
agent so destructive, in hands so lawless, the duty of precaution was correspondingly great. There was no ground for doubt as to the legality of the
order to shoot.
"The relator was a private soldier and his first duty was obedience. His
orders were clear and specific and the evidence does not show that he went
beyond them in his action. There was no malice for it appears affirmatively
that he did not know, the deceased and acted only on his orders when the
situation appeared to call for action under them."

In Manley v. State, 137 Southwestern, 1137, a member of the
National Guard was indicted for murder committed in carrying out
orders to prevent people from entering a certain enclosure during a
celebration.
On appeal it was urged as error that the court below excluded
evidence that the defendant's superior officer had directed him to keep
the people out of the enclosure at all hazards.
The court said:
"The witness, as an officer superior in rank, should have been permitted to
state that he had given the appellant instructions to keep the people out of
the enclosure; but even if he commanded at all hazards, this would not
authorize appellant to kill a person or violate the law in order to do so.
Appellant under such instructions would be authorized to use only such means
as were necessary to accomplish this without taking life or committing an
assault."

11.

The opinions in some of the foregoing cases support the
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view that a military brder not manifestly illegal is a jiistificatio'n, but
on examination it will be found that the decisions in'these cases lo
not -depend upon any such doctrine.
In the Hutchinson case, Justice Byles certaiily did not mean that
a military order would be a defense in every case of manslaughter
through negligence, however gross such negligenc6 might be.
Probably all he meant was that such orders'w'ere in .general
relevant to the question of negligence, and that, in view'of the7 facts
shown in this particular case, the order to use the place for artillery
practice in his opinion settled the question in favor of the defendant.
Riggs v. State is a case often cited in support of the doctrine that
an order not plainly illegal is a defense. But outside of the dicta in
the opinion the case furnishes no support whatever to that doctrine.
The order to go with the scouting party was plainly legal and was
none the less so because others in the party may have had orders to
do an illegal act.
The legal order to go with the party furnished the defendant with
the means of establishing the innocence of his presence at the time
of the shooting, and thereby disconnecting himself 'from the -acts of
the others.
Commonwealth v. Shortallis a similar case. The court expressly
decided that the order of the sentry was legal and that his acts were in
strict conformity to his orders. This alone sufficed to relieve the
sentry from any criminal liability and left no occasion to resort to
the broader rule of exemption asserted in the opinion of the court.
12. The views of most of the military text writers are, of course,
in accord with.the 'broader rule; and the more restricted doctrine of
some" of the cases is vigorously assailed as involving the grossest injustice to the individual and the most disastrous consequences to the
discipline of the army.
O'Brien says:"
"The general rule of justice and natural equity is that a subordinate should
be justified for the performance of any act in obedience to orders, which was
not manifestly and clearly illegal."

Clode says: 9
"Such are the grounds upon which the officer would be justified idf giving
the order; and the justification of the soldier in obeying it would be, first,
under the rule of the Common Law, that an Inferior, in an ordinary criminal
case, might be held justified in obeying the directions-not obviously improper
or contrary to law-of a Superior Officer, that is, if the Inferior acted honestly
sAmerican
Military Law anat Courts-Martial, 1846, p. 83.
9
Military Forces of the Crown, Vol. II, p. 151, Sec. 68.
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upon what-he might not unreasonably deem to be the effect of the orders of his
Superior."

The non-miitary text writers in general follow the actual decisions of the courts' in making the liability depend on the illegality of
the order irrespective of whether it was or was not plainly so.
Hare says that tho general rule is that the command of a superior
will not justify the commission of an act which he cannot legally
authorize the subordinate to perform.' 0
Bishop states the rule as follows:"
"The command of a superior-as of a military officer to a subordinatewill not justify a criminal act done in pursuance of it. * * * In all these cases
the person doing the wrongful thing is guilty the same as though he had proceeded self-moved.

Dicey states that where a soldier is put on trial of a charge of
2
crime obedience to superior orders is not of itself a defense .1
14. To adopt a new rule of substantive law making obedience to
military orders not palpably illegal a distinct ground of justification
for criminal acts is believed to be objectionable.
Such a rule is too indefinite to be susceptible of anything like a
uniform application; and in any case likely to arise under it the
soldier who receives the order would very likely be as much at a loss
to determine whether the required degree of illegality existed as to
determine the fact of illegality itself.
Moreover, the fact that military orders are frequently communicated orally and in general terms and thus easily misunderstood
and not easily proved in their exact terms, together with the prohibitions against self-incrimination and against conviction in the face of
a reasonable doubt, would in the practical administration of justice
under such a rule operate to give immunity in many cases to all concerned in the criminal act an immunity which could not fail to induce
in many military persons a lack of caution with respect to the very
objects for which soldiers are maintained.
On principle and authority it is believed that obedience to military
orders is not of itself a justification.
15. But this does not mean that the fact that a soldier acted
in obedience to a superior's orders is unavailable to him in his defense
as a stepping stone to a recognized ground of justification.
And it is believed that a mistake is made in attempting to engraft
upon the substantive criminal law a new rule of justification in favor
' 0 American Constitutional Law, 1889, p. 914."'New Criminal Law, 8th Ed., Vol. I, Sec. 355.
12Law of the Constitution, 1908, p. 298.
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of soldiers who obey orders, instead of the much easier and equally
effective method of contending for a rule of evidence which will
accomplish the same results; thus availing ourselves of an expedient
by which the judges have indirectly but in effect molded and developed
the law while disclaiming any right to do so directly. (See Thayer's
Cases on Evidence, Chapter I, Section H, note.)
A soldier who obeys an illegal order with full knowledge of the
facts should not be allowed to justify his violation of the criminal law
under such order any more than a civilian.
The general and necessary rule that ignorance of law is no excuse
operates with extreme harshness in many cases, and a soldier to
claim exemption from punishment for acts done tinder orders ought
therefor to rest his claim on some other ground than injustice to
himself.
The argument ordinarily advanced is that discipline-the sinj
qua udn of an army-would be unattainable were well-meaning soldiers compelled to choose between alternative courses under penalty
for a mistake.
To dispose of this argument it seems sufficient to say that actual
experience does not warrant the assumption made therein, inasmuch
as discipline has been maintained in the face of adverse rulings by the
courts.
But mistake of fact seems to be a defense that can and should
be peculiarly available to a soldier acting under orders.
With regard to this defense in general, Bishop says :13
"What is absolute truth no man ordinarily knows, all act from what
appears, not what is. If persons were to delay their steps until made sure,
beyond every possibility of mistake, that they were right, earthly affairs would
cease to move; and stagnation, death, and universal decay would follow. All,
therefore, must and constantly do, perform what else they would not, through
mistake of facts. If their minds are pure; if they carefully inquire after
the truth, but are misled, no just law will punish them, however criminal their
acts would have been if prompted by an evil motive, and executed with the
real facts in view."

A soldier of subordinate grade is usually in the dark as to many
facts pertinent to the question of the legality of his orders; and where,
as will frequently be the case, it is imperative that he should not delay
or impracticable for him to inquire into the facts, he should not be
required to do either.
Therefore, where an order is given him by a superior, whom
he is entitled to regard as 'better informed than himself and whom he
13New Criminal Law, 8th Ed., Vol. I, Sec. 303.
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must under military law presume to be acting legally unless something
to the contrary appears, such order should be given great evidential
value toward establishing such a state of belief or ignorance on the
soldier's part as would exculpate him were such believed condition of

affairs actual.
Some such views are advanced by Hare and by Stephens.
Hare says :1"
"A subordinate stands as regard to these principles in a different position
from the superior whom lie obeys and may be absolved from liability for
executing an order which it was criminal to give.
The question is, as we have seen, had the accused reasonable cause for
believing in the necessity of the act which is impugned? and in determining
this point, a soldier or a member of the posse comitatus may obviously take
the orders of the person in command into view as proceeding from one who
is better able to judge and well informed; and if the circumstances are
such that the command may be justifiable, he should not be held guilty for
declining to decide that it is wrong with the responsibility incident to disobedience unless the case is so plain as not to admit of reasonable doubt."
Stephens says :15
"In all cases in which force is used against the person of another, both
the person who orders such force to be used and the person using that force is
responsible for its use and neither of them is justified by the circumstance that
he acts in obedience to orders given him by a civil or military superior, but
the fact that he did so act and the fact that the order was apparently lawful,
are in all cases relevant to the question whether he believed in good faith
and on reasonable grounds in the existence of a state of facts which would
have justified what he did apart from such orders."
This rule, broadened so as to apply where the order, under the
circumstances known to the soldier, could be legal, and strengthened
so as to make such facts not only relevant but effective to raise an affirmative presumption is believed to be the rule that should be adopted
by the civil and military courts in all criminal cases, except that the
rule should be modified so as to provide for cases where the facts as
believed by the soldier would justify him in acting under orders, but
not without.
To illustrate:
A sentry over prisoners of war is present at an altercation between one of them and his superior officer, who directs the sentinel
to take the prisoner out and shoot him.
On such a showing alone, without proof of the legality of the
order, it would not even be relevant in his defense; conversely were
the order in fact regal (as it would be where the officer carrying out
14 American Constitutional Law, Vol. II, p. 920.
15Digest of the Criminal Law, Sec. 202.
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sentence of a military commission) the sentry could not be convicted
by a military court of disobedience of orders.
A soldier in time of war is ordered to seize private property of a
citizen, there being nothing in the circumstances as known to the
soldier negativing a necessity for such seizure.
The order in .such a case raises a presumption that the soldier
believed in good faith and on reasonable, grounds in the existence of
a state of affairs justifying the order and his acts under it; and should
he disobey the order he would have to show its illegality.
Such a rule would go very far toward eliminating the present
differences in the military and civil views of this matter and would
enable each forum to dispose of such cases without any injustice that
can be recognized as such.
16. In conclusion it may be stated that the sense of military
persons founded on actual experience confirms the view that the
hardship in such cases whatever rule may be adopted is "more apparent
than real."
After a war, general acts relieving soldiers from prosecution for
acts done in bona-fide obedience to orders such as were enacted after
the civil war may be looked for; and, in ordinary times such cases are
not often prosecuted.
Where they are prosecuted by a state the proceeding may sometimes 'be stopped through habeas corpus by i. federal court, and in the
rare event of an unjust conviction, a final resort May be had to the
pardoning power, as was done in the case of General Bright and his
co-defendants.
The practical result, under any rule, is as stated by Hare thaI a
soldier "runs little risk in obeying any orders which a man of common sense so placed would regard as warranted by the circumstances."
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